The article 251 of the European Community and the article 189 b of the European Treaty are the landmarks in European history, as they settled the co decision procedure and therefore put forward the European parliament. The European Parliament used to be the poor parent of the European constitutional triangle. Since the Maastricht treaty and several other treaties that followed, the European assembly gained power and credibility. Indeed, the revalorization of the parliament is at the core of the implementation of the co decision procedure. As its name suggests it, this procedure aims at rallying the two of the three main institutions in order to work together. It also started to end the eurocracy and bring about the advent of a more transparent Europe that took place within the Community Method, e.g. the participation of the three institutions in the decision making process.
[...] The steps are numerous which explains why the procedure takes so many time. It is the Commission that has the innitiative power. The parlements can then adopt a common motion via the majority rule, the Council follows the european deputees by including their views in the text. Then the text goes back to the Parliament who can adopt the final motion or reject it with a qualified majority. If amendments are adopted by a mojority of euro-deputees, the text returns to the Commissionners hands who send it back to the council. [...]
[...] For instance, the foreign policy, part of the agricol policy or the intern market are exclusively determined by the Council. Not to mention the Monnetary policy that is of the European Central bank competence. Nevertheless, those points that one may see as defaults have a rational explication. The complexity is a direct consequence of the need of conciliation between members states. Both the Coucil of Ministers or the Parliament have a legitimity, both need to have a word when it comes to decide whether or not a text is to become a law. [...]
[...] Still, they was a progressive evolution. The Amsterdam treaty (1997) did a lot to democratize the legislative process (the treaty extended the areas concerned by the Codecision and simplified the procedure) while the Nice treaty (2003) enlarged the areas concerned by the Codecision to Since Nice, the domains that are voted to the qualified majority by the council are concerned by the codecision and this mechanism was declared "legislative process of reference". Last but not least, the Lisbonne treaty extended the procedure to numerous new fields, as justice, security or agriculture. [...]
[...] It also started to end the eurocracy and brought the advent of a more transparent europe that took place within the Community Methode, e.g. the participation of the tree institutions in the decision making process. As a matter of fact, we may wonder what are the process of co-decision and its implications for the European institutions? We may study in a first part that the Co-decision is the result of a progressive evolution that led to the implementation of a complex process. [...]
[...] Therefore, Codecision appear as a just compromise. If the codecison does not apply in various branches of the European law, it it is mostly because they are seen as so decisive that the states are reluctant to give up their sovereinty to the Parliament. As a matter of fact, head of states prefere to have a real influence, to have the power to decide and they do so through the Council. Some may blame the Codecision, on top of being too complex, of accumulating the procedures. [...]
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