European Law - Article 30 of the Treaty of the European Union

Extraits

[...] Indeed, there are special circumstances for anti-dumping situation. Chalmers defines dumping as the situation “where a producer from outside the EC sells goods within the EC at such a low price that traders within the EC cannot compete.”[8] The Council Regulation 384/96 of the 22nd December 1995 provides that the Commission can only act in this context by regulations addressed to Members State. Even if the act is a regulation, the court in Extramet[9] stated that follows that measures imposing anti-dumping duties may, without losing their character as regulations, be of individual concern in certain circumstances to certain traders This case demonstrates a more liberal approach of the challenge by the court and a less formal view of conditions. [...]

[...] First of all, there are the “privileged applicants” who are Members State, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. They have unlimited legal standing and their locus standi is automatic: it means that they are always allowed to challenge an act even if themself or their citizens are not directly concerned. Secondly, there are the “semi privileged applicants” which are the Court of Auditors and the European Central Bank: they can bring an action to protect their prerogatives. Thirdly, there are the “non-privileged applicants” which are natural or legal persons which are concerned because decisions are addressed to them or because decisions are addressed to another person but they are directly and individually concerned. [...]

[...] Moreover, other illustrations can be found to demonstrate a more liberal approach (not reserved to special situations as anti-dumping) by the court which fit better with the article 49 of the Charter. Indeed, the court seems to have developed an approach which looks beyond the nature of the act and is more interested in the situation of the applicants. In the case Codorniu[10], Cordoniu was a Spanish producer of wine who used the words “Gran Creman”. But a Council regulation in 1989 provides that these terms can be only used for French and from Luxembourg wines. It can be observed that this is the same context as Plaumann: the agriculture. [...]

[...] Indeed, in this case this is the opinion of the Advocate General which must be studied. He states that the restrictive approach of Plaumann should be set aside in order that the courts apply a more liberal approach based on the effective judicial protection and adds that all of those reasons, that the case law on the locus standi of individual applicants . is incompatible with the principle of judicial protection this opinion was followed by the Court of first Instance in case Jégo-Quéré v Commission[13] which took in account the Article 47 of the Charter, the court held that (Articles 230 and 241 on the one hand, and by (Article 234 on the other, the Treaty has established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of acts of the institutions, and has entrusted such review to the Community Courts” and also adds that “Thus it is for the Member States to establish a system of legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the right to effective protection.” Court insists on the fact that there are other ways to challenge acts and that the compatibility with the Article 47 of the Charter is also a duty of the Member States. [...]

[...] Indeed, he argues that this approach is unnecessary. The standing rule aims to avoid an actio popularis which can be bring waves of cases in front of the court but it appears unnecessary for the court to use this restrictive formula because they can accord standing to those who are in the business of importing clementines without “being overwhelmed by a flood of applications for judicial review.” Secondly, Chalmers states that it is “doctrinally problematic” because Plaumann was specifically affected by the decision and he has a legal interest to challenge the act. [...]