The fundamental constitutional principles of the British constitution

Extraits

[...] - No civil action may be brought in respect of the commands or actions of a judge exercising their judicial role. It is as a result of a case: Anderson/Gorrie 1985. No civil action may be brought in relation to a jury's verdict. Once the jury has decided we cannot sue the jury members: Bushell's case 1670. Mps have rights and immunities that go beyond those granted to ordinary citizens such as freedom of expression and freedom from arrest in the Palace of Westminster (they cannot be taken to Court for what they say and they cannot be arrested in the House of Common, there is a special police) but they are individuals who are subjects to additional legal restraints. [...]

[...] There are a number of contradictions of these principles in the modern constitution (British constitutional law in the 20th century). First, the monarch in her or his personal capacity is not subject to the jurisdictions of the ordinary courts (the monarch can do no wrong). Relatives of the monarch can be brought in Courts. The Crown (civil servants) is also in a privileged position in litigations, this is a result of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 and the government as an entity cannot be sued in tort (law of torts/tort: responsabilité quasi délictuelle/délictuelle) for the actions of the servants. [...]

[...] The Massachusetts constitution (1780) refers to the government of laws not men. The rule of law is also often recognized as a means of ensuring (to ensure) the protection of individual rights against unfettered powers (unlimited government power). In the UK the general concept of the rule of law has become identified with Dicey's explanation of the doctrine in his Seminal text 1885 Introduction to the study of the law of constitution. Dicey's rule of law: We have to detail what the 3 points of the fundamental constitutional principles are: - No person is punishable in body or goods according to Dicey except for a distinct breach of the law. [...]

[...] This pre-eminence given to Statues is a consequence of the supremacy of Parliament. When there is conflict between CL and Statute law, Statute law has the upper hand. The separation of powers If the separation of power was absolute, government would be impossible. Montesquieu's theory has been reinterpreted in the 18th by a judge called William Blackstone (1723; 1780) to mean, to signify that it was not so much necessary for distinct/each branches of government to hold each own some power with no influence over the other 2 branches but what was essential was that there should be a check and balance system operating between the 3 branches of Government. [...]

[...] So in the 17th century, the British judiciary is already independent from the executive. Here, the judiciary doesn't tell the secretary of States that he had no right to do what he did. The illustrations of the case Entick/Carrington 1765 are: - The court first held that the plea (argument) of State's necessity which had been invoked by Carrington was unknown to common law because there was no common law precedent or no Statute from which such a plea of State's necessity could be derived (point 3 of Van Dicey: no possible to sue Entick). [...]