Marriage is a specific kind of contract "based upon a voluntary private agreement by a man and a woman to become husband and wife?. So in a sense, marriage is a contract like another one, the only difference being that the two contracting parties are strictly determined by the law as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife".
In the beginning, the American family law was influenced by the "Christian conception of marriage as a sacrament, a holy union between a man and a woman". Thanks to its power, Christianity indeed managed to make its rule the law of Britain and later, the law of the United States. In this context, divorce was almost impossible because the Christian idea was that marriage is an "indissoluble union". However, with mounting pressures from different groups, some states in America decided to authorize divorce as soon as the beginning of the 19th century.
[...] Finally, more and more law and economics scholars argue that tax rates have a much bigger influence on divorce rates than divorce laws have. In a lot of countries, like in the United States, the so-called marriage “penalties” are said to have a big influence on divorce rates. Marriage “penalties” are the “higher taxes required from some married couples than for the same two people filing two separate tax returns”[17]. According to a study, “marriage penalties induce a small but significant increase in the propensity to divorce for women, with a smaller effect for men”[18]. [...]
[...] Marriage penalty page on Wikipedia.org. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marriage_penalty Anthony DNES, Robert ROWTHORN. The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce. New York: Cambridge University Press p.165. Jens. M. SCHERPE. “Cohabitation, Marriage and the Law: Social Change and Legal Reform in the 21st Century” in International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 2007 21(1):133-136. [...]
[...] New York: Cambridge University Press p Anthony DNES, Robert ROWTHORN. The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce. New York: Cambridge University Press p.192. Max RHEINSTEIN. Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press Robert COOTER and Thomas ULEN, Law and Economics, 5th Ed., Pearson Press 2004. To read a numerical example: Anthony DNES, Robert ROWTHORN. The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce. New York: Cambridge University Press p.194. Robert COOTER and Thomas ULEN, Law and Economics, 5th Ed., Pearson Press 2004. [...]
[...] New York: The Free Press p.1. Ibid, p.5. Lenore J. WEITZMAN. The Divorce Revolution. The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America. New York: The Free Press p.15. Lenore J. WEITZMAN. The Divorce Revolution. The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America. New York: The Free Press p.13. [...]
[...] So now I have analyzed the economics of the at-fault divorce system and of the no-fault divorce system. These past years, some law and economics scholars have argued that divorce laws don't matter and that whatever the law is divorce rates will not change. That's why I would like to turn now to a discussion on whether divorce laws influence divorce rates. III. But does divorce law affect divorce rates? Several studies have pointed out that divorce laws had no effect on divorces rates. [...]
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